This is part two of the story of one of the least known, but one of the most important wars in American history, the Mexican War of 1846--1848. It is also the story of the spirit of an age: Manifest Destiny and the expansion west of a young restless nation and the role that Georgia's volunteer militia played in it.

Georgia's militia regiment had traveled to Texas to help win independence for that territory from Mexico.  Prior to any fighting between the Americans and the Mexicans, however, the Georgia volunteers, frustrated by days and nights in steamy holding camps engaged in fights among themselves.  Needless to say, the men in the volunteer camps were enthusiastic to fight somebody.  Or anybody, and were popping off their muskets or rifles at passing game - or at nothing at all.  So much ammunition was flying about that engineer Lieutenant George G. Meade decided that passing a day in his tent was as perilous as being in battle.  West Pointer Meade, the future victor of Gettysburg, derided the volunteers as "one costly mass of ignorance, confusion and insubordination."^l

Of course, the volunteers commented in kind.  George C. Furber, a young Tennessee attorney who joined a volunteer cavalry regiment early in the war wrote: "He [Furber] was baffled that any man of intelligence could be induced to enlist in the regular army, for a regular soldier required only so much brains as would enable him to stand erect, keep his clothing clean, understand the commands, and handle a musket.  Beyond this, he needed only enough language to ask for his eatables and, when out of the hearing of the officers, to swear freely.  The pay was poor, the prospect for promotion virtually hopeless.  There was no reward for this grim existence, unless it be the fact that soldiers were fed and clothed without thought or care to themselves.²

Among the volunteers there was a feeling of superiority over the regulars that they (the volunteers) never hesitated to express.  Yet the volunteers were somewhat impressed, but still cynical about the organization and discipline of the regulars' camps.  This mutual resentment provided a fertile ground for a bitter rivalry between the volunteers and regulars called by some "the hidden wart" within the American military establishment involving pettiness, vanity, personal ambition, and professional jealously.  Hostility between the regular soldier and the volunteer soldier persisted throughout the war.³

President Polk and the War Department, eager to bring the war to a swift and decisive conclusion, began to press Taylor for a quick victory.  For a beginning, Taylor decided to move his army up the Rio Grande to Camargo (Map 3), a distance of about one hundred miles.  As people from the United States continued to swarm into Matamoros (Map 3), Taylor began moving them to Camargo, which seemed to be the logical staging point for his planned assault on Monterrey (Map 1).⁴

By early August, Taylor's regular army contingents were already on hand at Camargo.  During the remaining August, the volunteer units also left Camp Belknap (Map 2) by water for Camargo (Map 3).  'Me trip up the Rio Grande was both novel and perilous.  The high water, strong current, and inexperienced pilots delayed the river boat so much that the journey took a week.  The water overflowed the banks and covered the country for miles; the pilots found it difficult just to identify and stay within the river itself, and sometimes it was necessary to stop and send the troops ashore to gather wood for the river boat's boiler.⁵

The first of the volunteer regiments arrived at Camargo Sunday, August 16.  The town itself was up the San Juan River (Map 3) about three miles from its junction with the Rio Grande.  The American camp, which eventually held more than 12,000 men, was spread southward along the San Juan River.  Unfortunately, its water was even less potable than that of the Rio Grande.  In fact, Luther Giddings of the lst Ohio Regiment wryly estimated that the water of the San Jaun consisted of eighty percent liquid and twenty percent mud.  To add to the health hazard some soldiers were complacently filling camp kettles alongside others doing laundry.  Meanwhile, upstream Texans were washing their horses, and even further upstream Mexican women were carrying away water far cleaner than that which filled the canteens of the soldiers.⁶

At first, the camp at Camargo appeared agreeable.  The regulars' camp was impeccably organized.  The infantry, artillery, and cavalry, all in the same field, were each in place, their appointments and discipline" perfect.  General Taylor was standing nearby his tent "dressed in linen coat and trousers, twirling a straw hat between his fingers, and apparently conversing with or dictating to someone within."⁷
 
 

Unfortunately, the glitter at Camargo was confined to Taylor and his regulars.  For the volunteers the very name Camargo was synonymous with boredom, filth, and tragic death.  Disease struck again!  Its ravages had been bad enough at Matamoros, where it was common for a 900 man regiment to have 150 on sick call; at Camargo sickness spread through the camp like wildfire.  The volunteers understood little of camp sanitation, and dysentery and yellow fever raged unchecked.  Some 1,500 American soldiers died of disease - almost as many as would die of battle wounds in the entire war.  At times, 30 percent of Taylor's command was bedridden.  The death march never ceased throughout the day.  Large hospital tents setup in the camp were constantly full; the dead were removed at sunrise and sunset.  Still, the nearby troops could hear the groans and lamentations of the poor sufferers throughout the night.⁸

By early September 1846, the need to leave Camargo was becoming a matter of urgency.  President Polk, the press, and the public were becoming impatient.  General Taylor, the hero of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, was now being called "General Delay." Of course, Taylor was yearning to remove his army from the cesspool of Camargo, hence he chose to move even though his force was not ready.  Taylor decided to make up for his shortage of wagons by substituting mules.  Further, he chose to advance with only a portion of his army, all his regulars (about 3,200) and only about 3,000 of his volunteers.  And, he decided to take only a portion of his available heavy artillery.⁹

On August 19, 1846, Worth's 2nd Division set out for Cerralvo (Map 3), about sixty miles away, to establish a forward base there.  Twiggs' lst Division would follow Worth in a few days, and the "Field Division," Butler's select volunteers would bring up the rear.  On a parallel route, to the left (south), Hays' Texas Rangers would march by way of China (Map 3), presumably to join up with Taylor's main body at Marin (Map 3).¹⁰

Since Taylor had decided that he could take only 3,000 volunteers to Monterrey, out of 7,700 such volunteers on hand at Carmago, his decision as to which to take was a touchy matter.  The volunteers left behind "for instruction and camp service" were to be subjected to a "rigid system of police and discipline." The volunteer regiments that would go on the march were reduced to 500 men each, exclusive of officers; they left behind "all sick and disabled men and all who shall not be deemed capable of undergoing the fatigue and privations of the campaign."

Each of the 4,700 men left behind were bound to be bitterly disappointed as they had signed up to fight, not to die in mud holes.  Nevertheless, the decision had to be made, and Taylor's prime consideration, so he wrote the War Department, "was to draw from as many States as possible." Common sense, of course, also meant giving priority to those units least depleted by disease.  So he selected, besides the Texans, the Mississippi Rifles, the Tennessee Regiment, the 1st Ohio, and the Baltimore-Washington Battalion.  Those left behind, including the entire Georgia Regiment, were divided among the Camargo and Matamoros camps in the lower Rio Grande, and the hospital.  All of the units were assigned to a large Volunteer Division under the loose command of newly arrived Major General Robert Patterson.¹¹

The last of Taylor's select force left Camargo on Sunday, September 6 and encamped before the walls of Monterrey (Map 3) thirteen days later (September 19).  A stirring and dangerous adventure lay ahead for those who would face the guns of the enemy, but, for them the miserable period of the buildup was over.  As they waited for action, some probably reflected on their comrades who suffered at Camargo.  The number of deaths during Taylor's stay there were startling.  For example, when Taylor's army finally marched out, only 370 of 795 Georgians were present for duty; only 324 of 754 Alabamians; and 317 of 588 in the 2d Tennessee.  An estimated 1,500 men died at Camargo - one out of every eight to encamp there.  Taylor was keenly aware of the suffering of his men, and hewas acutely cognizant that it was inadequate advance information about the site that caused him to select that location as a concentration point.  Once there, however, he was powerless to do anything other than to visit the hospitals, plan to leave when possible, and to write the adjutant general asking for a supplement in medical officers.¹²

On September 19, 1846, an escort for a payroll shipment to Monterrey was needed.  General Patterson immediately ordered 250 men from Colonel Jackson's Georgia Regiment to serve as the escort.  Captain Chance, a regimental quartermaster at Camargo, wrote: "They (the Georgians] were fine looking men and I heard it said the choice companies of the regiment including the celebrated Jasper Greens were composed almost entirely of Irishmen, of which a Georgian reminded in my presence 'Give the Jasper Greens some whiskey and they will charge into Hell."¹³

Volunteers from Georgia also undertook other mission.  For example, in October 1846, Captain Chance deployed of the remainder of the Georgia Regiment's companies to guard a supply train to Monterrey.  He later noted that, "this was a busy day - orders and counter orders, 1,500 pack mules being loaded with provisions, flour, sugar, etc., for the army at Monterrey - 60 wagons with ordnance stores and pork and pack mules with forage.  Besides 50 pack mules to the use of the military escort consisting of the five remaining companies of the Georgia Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Redd commanding.  Such a scene, clerks, agents, contractors, dashing about on horseback.  Mexicans packing the mules - mules kicking up and running off, ale cider and wine dealt out at the sutler's stores (spirituous liquors being forbidden), underlings half drunk and insolent, superiors issuing orders - oaths and profanity on all hands in all languages - one soldier being drunk stabbed a mule with a bayonet from mere wantonness - I was standing not a hundred yards off .... In the evening, prior to their departure, Colonel Redd, who was commanding the Georgia companies, called at my tent and took supper with me.  He is a young man of about 23, gallant and brave as a lion.  He said he had fought the Mexicans in Texas and that they are a brave people and all the difference between them and us is that they can not shoot as well (never taking aim) and are not animated in patriotism ... but he thinks now they are learning to shoot better and from late indications are becoming united and patriotic.  He thinks the fighting has just commenced.  He says it is his intention not to trouble General Patterson with prisoners - but will hang all Mexicans who give battle from here to Monterrey."¹⁴

By November 1846, the United States Army, reinforced with thousands of volunteers and aided by the Navy, had overrun Monterrey (Map 3), occupied Mexico proper as far south as Saltillo and conquered most of California and New Mexico.  The Mexican Army of the North had been routed.  Yet Santa Anna refused to negotiate a peace settlement.  The strategy of occupying the northern provinces had failed to bring peace.

Now, in November, 1846, there was a lull in the war while strategy was considered both in Washington and Mexico City.  In Washington, President Polk had to set in motion a plan that echoed the daring thrust of the Spanish conquistador Cortez, 300 years earlier: breach Mexico at Vera Cruz, its principal port, then strike inland to seize the capital city.¹⁵

On November 10, 1846, President Polk selected Winfield Scott to command an expedition to land at Vera Cruz and march to Mexico City.  Scott promptly submitted a list to the War Department of the men and materiel he required to execute his plan.  On November 23, 1846, Scott issued orders to Taylor to send the core of his army to staging points at the mouth of the Rio Grande and Tampico for transport to Scott's invasion staging area.  Thus by the end of January 1847, the core of Taylor's former army was camped on the coast awaiting transport to join Scott's invasion force.¹⁶

Meanwhile, Taylor had, on his own, decided to alter his strategy and hence began to concentrate on occupying strong points.  His first order was to reorganize and abolish the bulky Volunteer Division which was composed of the Ohio and Kentucky Infantry regiments in one brigade (Butler) and the Georgia, Mississippi, and 1st Tennessee regiments in another (Quitman).

Taylor took Twiggs' division, with Quitman's brigade and the Baltimore Battalion, along with him to Victoria (Map 1), leaving Worth at Saltillo (Map 3), Wool at Parras (Map 1), and Butler at Monterrey (Map 3).  Butler, the senior officer, would be in overall command of the troops left behind.  Patterson, currently at Matamoros, would join Taylor at Victoria.  At Monte Morelos on the way to Victoria, the 2nd Infantry and 2d Tennessee Regiment joined Taylor for the march to Victoria.

On January 4, 1847, Taylor entered Victoria, but did not remain there long.  Instead, on January 14, he returned to Monterrey after hearing that the Polk Administration had decided that the bulk of his army - most of his regulars and some of his volunteers would be transferred to Scott's new expedition. (Map 1) From Monterrey, on February 5, Taylor went to Saltillo, where he became involved in the operation that led to the Battle of Buena Vista (Map 3).

In February, 1847, despite a repeated order that he remain strictly on the defensive, Taylor moved forward again, this time to Agua Nueva, south of Saltillo - and waited for events to develop.  Santa Anna had intercepted a letter from Scott to Taylor discussing the landing at Vera Cruz and decided to crush Taylor's forces before the landing could be staged.  On February 2, 1847, Santa Anna started marching north and on the twenty first reached La Encarnacion (Map 3), thirty five miles from Taylor's headquarters at Agua Nueva (Map 3).  Taylor, hearing of Santa Anna's approach, realized that Agua Nueva was indefensible and decided on February 21, to retreat to Buena Vista Ranch (Map 3) where his outnumbered army could take up a strong defensive position.

The armies of Taylor and Santa Anna came face to face at Buena Vista on February 22, 1847, Santa Anna with about 20,000 men gave Taylor one hour to surrender.  When the demand was rejected the Mexican General attacked.  It was a fierce battle and the Americans with only about 4,800 men came close to defeat.  During the heavy fighting on the second day, Santa Anna turned the American left flank, but Taylor, who had been to Saltillo to check its defenses, arrived on the field with fresh troops and saved the day.  Moreover, Taylor's light artillery decimated Santa Anna legions, and during the night of the 23rd, the Mexican commander ended the battle and retreated to San Luis Potsi (Map 1). The battle of Buena Vista ended Taylor's campaign in Mexico.  'Me war would be concluded by Scott's Army as it battled its way from Vera Cruz to Mexico City.  In northern Mexico the major fighting was over - the 5,000 men who remained would serve as an army of occupation.  Later, in 1848, Zachary Taylor would capitalize on his celebrated victory at Buena Vista during his run for president.¹⁷

Among the units ordered to join Scott's expedition was the reorganized Volunteer Division of Major General Robert Patterson that was occupying Victoria.  The march to the coast had taken ten days.  Compared with the regulars, many of the volunteers were a disorderly lot.  They ravaged the country as they passed, stealing chickens and cattle, killing locals who resisted and sometimes raping women.  As an excuse for their depredations, the volunteers pointed out that American soldiers had been killed and mutilated by Mexican guerrillas.  Volunteers were punished if they were caught, but for the most part their crimes went undetected.  Scott wrote in disgust to the Secretary of War William L. Marcy: "Truly it would seem unchristian and cruel to let loose upon any people - even savages - such unbridled persons freebooters, &c.,&c." Eventually, Scott had to place Tampico under martial law to control the situation.¹⁸

In the ranks, regulars and volunteers regarded each other with mutual disdain.  Conversely  , a volunteer captain noted that officers of the Regular Army "seem to think themselves above us Volunteer officers, being cold and distant.  Consequently, we act the same toward them." One colonel of volunteers wrote: "there is so strong a feeling of jealousy and opposition to the volunteers, that while the command and control of the army and all its departments is in the hands of regular officers, justice will never be done to the Volunteers."¹⁹

To be sure of success, Scott's concept demanded an amphibious assault force -assembled on an island off the Mexican coast - of a scale unmatched in U.S. history for a century.  Lobos Island (Map 1) in the Gulf of Mexico was selected as the launching point for the invasion and more than 200 ships ferried soldiers who camped on the coral beaches and prepared for the assault on Mexico.  Beginning in February, 1847, Scott gradually amassed I 1,000 troops, less than half the number his invasion plan called for.  However, most had already faced Mexican fire under Taylor.  He had only one third of the munitions he needed and fewer than half of the special surfboats he had ordered built to ferry his men ashore.²⁰

Sprinkled through Scott's army were some familiar faces.  Colonel Jefferson Davis, General Taylor's son-in-law, who was the commander of the Mississippi Rifles.  A 40-year-old captain of engineers named Robert E. Lee, who had never faced enemy fire during his 20-year Army career, had also joined Scott's staff.  Ulysses S. Grant was a reluctant quartermaster lieutenant in the 4th Infantry.  Thomas J. Jackson entered the war as an artillery lieutenant fresh out of West Point.  His rock-steady nerve under fire earned him the rank of major in 1847 and the nickname "Stonewall."²¹

In mid-February, 1847, Scott was able to leave Brazos Santiago (Map 3) to check on preparations for his invasion.  On the nineteenth he arrived at Tampico (Map 1) and proceeded to General Patterson's headquarters.  He found about 9,000 men at Tampico, prepared to embark.  Four brigades, under Generals Twiggs, Pillow, Shields, and Quitman, were to embark on the 20th and 21st of February.

The scene in and about Tampico, was charged with excitement and anticipation.  Reviews of troops, in regiments, and brigades, were daily taking place; vessels were continually arriving with goods, merchandise and military stores.  By now, the American population was aware and intensely excited about the coming invasion.  However, there was no indication as to what Santa Anna was doing in the interior of Mexico.

General Scott left Tampico on February 20 for Lobos Island, ten miles off the coast, about sixty miles south of Tampico and some 130 miles from Vera Cruz (Map 1).  Here the American fleet was assembling for the movement to Vera Cruz.  Scott wrote to Secretary of War Marcy concerning the troops and equipment that had not arrived as scheduled.  February slipped by and Scott could delay no longer.  On March 2, he and his army sailed from Lobos Island for Vera Cruz with two regular divisions and a division of volunteers commanded by General Patterson.  In Patterson's division were three brigades led by Generals Gideon J. Pillow of Tennessee, John A. Quitman of Mississippi and James Shields of Illinois.  The Georgia Regiment was part of Quitman's Brigade.²²

By March 6, 1847, Scott's Army lay poised on-board 30 ships off Anton Lizardo (Map 1), the rendezvous point, about fourteen miles south and east of Vera Cruz.  After two additional days of reconnoitering, the invasion began early on March 9, with a nine mile ride to the beach.  The Americans found only empty dunes, windswept and untracked.  The Mexicans had abandoned defense of the beaches.  All 11,000 Americans reached the shore without casualty or injury.  Then, brigades led by Pillow, Quitman and Shields began the encirclement of Vera Cruz, to bottle up the city's 3,360-man garrison and prevent reinforcements from entering.  After a few days of siege, a massive bombardment of Vera Cruz began.  Three days later, on March 29, the Mexicans formally gave up the city.²³

At once, Scott began preparing for the advance into Mexico.  As usual, he was beset with difficulties; supply was inadequate and slow in arriving.  The volunteers, though becoming soldiers, still gave trouble, and the 20year term of enlistment for many of them had or was about to expire.  There were also the persistent problem of maintaining relations with the civilian population common to armies of occupation.

Scott's biggest problem, however, was his desperate need for draft and pack animals to support the offensive to Mexico City.  All along Scott had planned to get the larger part of them from the Mexican countryside, and this scheme became more critical when large numbers of horses and mules convoyed from the States were lost in the ship wrecks or groundings of at least forty supply vessels.. A likely source of horses was thought to be the Alvarado River Valley (Map 4), some forty five miles southeast of Vera Cruz.  The Navy was also interested in Alvarado because its port afforded the best source of fresh water.

Therefore, on the afternoon following the day Vera Cruz was occupied, a joint navy-army expedition set out to take Alvarado - Quitman's brigade of Georgia, Alabama and South Carolina troops, and Commodore Matthew C. Perry with a good part of the fleet.  The plan was for the navy to withhold its attack until the army was in position to prevent the sought after horses from being run off into the interior by the Mexicans.

On the evening of April 1, however, as Quitman approached the town by land, he was met by Midshipman Temple with a note saying that the town of Alvarado had already surrendered to the steamer Scourge, Navy Lieutenant Charles G. Hunter commanding. The Scourge, mounting one gun on deck and carrying forty men, had been sent ahead by Perry with orders to reconnoiter the mouth of the river.  However, when he approached the fort, Hunter decided to fire a round or two.  The Mexican commander thinking this was a demand for surrender, having heard about what had already happened at Vera Cruz, promptly complied.  Hunter left a midshipman and five men to occupy Alvarado, and took his steamer on upriver to extend his captures to the inland town of Tlacotalpam so that when the Commodore and his squadron arrived, they were greeted by the sight of the American flag flying at the mouth of the river and the sound of Hunter and his one gun banging away upstream.

Furious at Hunter for exceeding his orders and flushing the covey before Quitman was in position to round up the horses, Perry put Hunter under arrest and preferred charges.  A court martial sustained his charges and sentenced the lieutenant to be reprimanded.  But word of Hunter's daring got back to the United States and "Alvarado" Hunter became famous ds a hero for taking the town with only one gun and not a single marine of Perry's fleet going ashore.

With no hope of capturing any horses or mules, Quitman turned his brigade around and started his long march back to Vera Cruz.  In the meantime, Scott could delay no longer.  Regardless of his problems, he had to move inland toward Mexico City.  His objective was Jalapa, 69 miles to the northwest up the National Road.  General Twiggs' regular division led the advance out of the city on April 8. Patterson's Division of volunteers left the next day.  Worth's division was to follow as soon as some kind of transport could be arranged.  Scott remained in Vera Cruz to work on his administrative and logistics problems and planned to join his army immediately if it should encounter serious resistance.²⁴

Meanwhile, Santa Anna planned a defense near the small town of Cerro Gordo (Map 1). It was 12 miles coastward from Jalapa (Map 1) where the National Road passed between commanding hills as it began the climb into the highlands to Mexico City (Map 1). By April 12, Santa Anna's 12,000 troops were entrenching themselves and laying their cannon on the summits.  Here in Cerro Pass, in a narrow, four mile gap between almost perpendicular hills - also known as the Devil's Jaws - in these, as in a vise, the Mexican General proposed to crush Scott's army.²⁵

On 12 April, Twiggs' Division came in contact with the Mexican defenses at Cerro Gordo.  Twiggs wanted to attack immediately but was ordered by General Patterson, as the senior officer present, to wait for General Scott to arrive.  Scott arrived on April 14.  After a careful engineers' reconnaissance by Captain Robert E. Lee, the American attack began on April 18, 1847.  Although there was a fierce fight, the Mexicans were driven from their positions.  Scott let all of the Mexican prisoners go; he had no means of feeding them and he hoped that word of leniency would incline the Mexicans to be less tenacious in future encounters.²⁶

After their defeat at Cerro Gordo, the Mexicans retreated through Jalapa (Map 1) along the National Highway to the town of Perote (Map 1) about thirty miles from Jalapa. and beyond.  On April 19, 1847, the day after the victory at Cerro Gordo, the American Army moved on to the hill town of Jalapa, about 13 miles beyond the battlefield.  There the Americans posted Scott's Order Number 20, which declared martial law; they set up a headquarters and a hospital and went into bivouac nearby.  In Jalapa, problems were shaping up that would haunt Scott for the rest of his campaign.  Though he could buy food
and forage locally, he lacked wagons and horses to bring up the tons of military supplies from Vera Cruz; the few skimpy wagon trains that did head inland were attacked on the road by bandits and groups of belligerent civilians.  Just to get messages through this guerrilla blockade, Scott had to hire a robber band headed by a cutthroat named Manuel Dominguez to serve as couriers.  It was impossible to guard the whole stretch of road against hit-and-run attacks.  And when cavalry units were used as escorts, the troopers and their mounts were worn to a frazzle.  The only real solution was to delay each wagon train until a large force of Jalapa-bound soldiers had been assembled to march along as guards.  Although the need was critical, there was no sign of the new volunteers promised by the War Department.²⁷

To make matters worse, Scott was having trouble with the soldiers already at Jalapa.  Many troops had not been paid for months; they were growing restless in their crude shanty-town bivouac on the northern outskirts of Jalapa, which was sourly named "Camp Misery" (Map 1).  Though the regulars generally behaved well enough, a number of unruly volunteers roamed about unchecked, pillaging the countryside.  Mexican civilians lodged a flurry of real and invented complaints.  Scott's officers in charge of military government made an example of several Americans, disciplining them with 30 lashes.  Many soldiers got hold of locally made alcoholic beverages and went on binges.  Dr. John Campbell, a young surgeon at the hospital at Vera Cruz, later treated hundreds of dysentery victims, many of whom fell ill, Campbell complained, they kept on "drinking wine and liquor and swilling fruits in spite of what I say."²⁸

Scott's most serious problem involved some 3,700 volunteers who had enlisted for only one year.  Their hitch was nearly finished, and it made no sense to send them forward if they were going to opt for returning home.  An Act of Congress, passed March 27, 1847, invited the men of the regiments to reenlist for the duration of the war.  When this order reached Scott's headquarters, he immediately sent it to the volunteer regiments concerned: the Tennessee Cavalry, 3rd and 4th Illinois infantry regiments, the 1st and 2nd Tennessee Infantry, the Georgia Infantry, and the Alabama Infantry.  Scott, himself, passed among the regiments that would soon be eligible to leave Mexico and pointed out the various re-enlistment inducements that had been authorized by Congress.  For example, many volunteers, when they signed up, had been promised both a certificate redeemable for up to 160 acres of land and travel money to get them home from the point of discharge.  Additionally, some were offered bonuses of up to three months' wages to extend their enlistments.  Despite Scott's best efforts, he discovered that only a few wished to reenlist after their one year term of service.  They had had enough bloodshed and disease, enough of marking time and going without pay, and more than enough of Camp Misery.²⁹

A number of the "short-timers" announced that they had no quarrel with General Scott, rather their grudge was against the government.  Scott, on the other hand, knew that the departure of the volunteers would delay the end of the war, but he could not, in good faith, hold these troops longer.  In any case, Scott ordered the men to get ready to leave Jalapa in a hurry; he wanted them to ship out of Vera Cruz before the yellow fever season peaked.  Hence, on May 3, Scott notified Colonel Henry Wilson, commanding Vera Cruz, to have transports ready for 3,000 men - the number to which the rigors of a year's campaigning had reduced the seven regiments.

On May 6 and 7, under the command of General Patterson, infantry regiments from Alabama and Georgia, the two from Illinois and two from Tennessee, and the Tennessee cavalry regiment, with independent companies from Louisiana and Kentucky marched away, cheering and grinning, the envy of those who stayed behind.  Their departure reduced Scott's army to only 7,000 men.³⁰

But, much to their sorrow, the seriously wounded volunteers at Camp Misery would have to wait to begin their trip home.  Since Mexican guerrillas had made the road to Vera Cruz impassable for all but the most heavily armed escorts, most of those left behind would be held for a whole month longer.  During that month of May the troops became bored, then unruly.  The wounded were dying daily.  Then, just before leaving, the last of the volunteers were subjected to the spectacle of five soldiers being punished in public.  "It chills one's blood," wrote one volunteer, "to see free Americans tied up and whipped like dogs, in a market yard in a foreign land."³¹

The final phase of the war was marked by vigorous Mexican resistance, but the Americans had superior arms, equipment and leadership.  After winning battles at Contreras, Churubusco, and Chapultepec, Scott captured Mexico City on September 14, 1847.  Santa Anna retired into exile, and a moderate government negotiated peace.³²

Before the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, concluded on February 2, 1848, Mexico ceded all territory north of an irregular line extending along the Rio Grande and from El Paso, by the way of the Gila River to the Pacific.  In return, the United States paid Mexico $15,000,000 and also assumed claims of U.S. citizens against Mexico amounting to $3,000,000.  The only subsequent major change in the Mexico-U.S. boundary was made in 1853 when, by the Gadsden treaty, the Mesilia valley (now southern Arizona) was sold to the United States by Mexico for $10,000,000.³³

In all, the total number of troops employed by the United States in the war with Mexico, including regulars, volunteers, and Navy, was 112,230.  The loss of lives in the war was costly on both sides.  For the Americans, 132,780 had died, and thousands more were maimed for life.  Of these, 944 regulars were killed or died of wounds; 607 volunteers me the same fate.  But, even more appalling, disease and accidents killed 5,821 regulars and 6,408 volunteers.  Mexican losses during the war are unknown, but estimates of the killed or wounded exceed those of the United States' forces.³⁴

In addition to the Georgia Regiment, other Georgians participated during the war.  Thomas H. S. Mamersly in his Complete Regular Army Register of the United States For One Hundred Years (1779-1879), stated that a total of 2,132 volunteers from the State of Georgia served in the Mexican War.

In the regular army were several officers from Georgia that served with distinction.  Among them was General David Emanuel Twiggs, who, on two occasions, commanded the right wing of General Taylor's Army.

He was promoted for gallantry, and Congress presented him with an elegant sword.  Another was Colonel James S. McIntosh, a veteran of the war of 1812 who was mortally wounded during a charge upon his regiment by the Mexican Cavalry at Molino del Rey, September 8, 1847.  His body was brought home to Savannah for burial and lay in state at his brother's residence with an American Flag draped over his coffin, upon which also rested his sword and the bullet-pierced uniform that he had worn at his last battle.  A grand procession escorted his body to the cemetery, where, with military honors, he was laid to rest as a "Georgian."

Colonel Robert M. Echols was thrown from his horse at the Natural Bridge in Mexico and received injuries from which he died. but he had already become distinguished and was breveted a brigadier general.  As for the United States Navy, Commodore Josiah Tattnall. son of Georgia Governor Tattnall, won distinction as commander of the famous "Mosquito Fleet" at the bombardment of Vera Cruz.  He was honored by the State of Georgia with a sword.

The Georgia Legislature also thanked General William H. T. Walker, Captain William J. Hardee and Lieutenant William M. Gardner for their gallantry during the war, and presented each of them with a sword.³⁵

In the regular army were several officers from Georgia who had served with distinction in the Mexican War and later rising to eminence in the Confederate Army during the Civil War.  Among them were James Longstreet, Lafayette McLaws, A. H. Colquitt, Goode Bryan, W. H. T. Walker and William J. Hardee.  Lieutenant, afterwards General Longstreet, was wounded at Chapultepec, just before the entrance into the city of Mexico.³⁶

The people of Georgia were delighted to honor the returning troops.  The State Legislature passed resolutions praising Colonel Henry R. Jackson's regiment, saying that their manly and soldierly conduct maintained and indicated the honor and valor of Georgia.

Although the Georgia volunteers arriving back home were treated as heroes, they all had shared an inglorious experience.  Soldering in Mexico was vastly different from marching before an admiring citizenry back home.  They had a phrase for the experience, to see the elephant.  John Russell Bartlett in his Dictionary of Ameticanisms (1884) defined it as a southwestern phrase although its use by mid-century was national in scope.  To see the elephant," according to Bartlett, was to undergo any disappointment of high raised expectations.  He cited the Mexican War to illustrate its usage: men who have volunteered for the Mexican War, expecting to reap lots of glory and enjoyment, but instead have found only sickness, fatigue, privations, and suffering, are currently said to have 'seen the elephant."'³⁷

The men from Georgia who had marched with Taylor and Scott went their separate ways--many to pioneer the recently enlarged West, and of course, most returned to their homes in Georgia where little more than a decade later they would take up arms again during America's Civil War.

1. David Nevin, The Mexican War (Alexandria, Va: Time-Life Books, 1978), 60 and passim.

2. Robert W. Johannsen, To the Halls of the Montezumas; the Mexican War in the American Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 41.

3. Otis A. Singletary, The Mexican War (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), 128.

4. Johannsen, 41.

5. John S. D. Eisenhower, So Far From God: The U.S. War with Mexico, 1846-1848 (New York: Random House, 1989), 106.

6. Ibid., 109.

7.  Ibid.

8. Ibid., 109-110.

9. Ibid., 111.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., 111-112.

12. Ibid., 110.

13. Joseph E. Chance, The Mexican War Journal of Captain Franklin Chance (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1991), 22.

14. Ibid., 32.

15. Eisenhower, 169.

16. Nevin, 126.

17. Eisenhower, 256-257.

18. Nevin, 133.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., 136.

22. Eisenhower, 257.

23. Nevin, 138.

24. Ibid., 141.

25. Ibid., 141-142.

26. Ibid., 142-149.

27. Ibid.., 171.

28. Ibid., 173.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., 173-174.

31, Eisenhower, 296

32. Nevin, 174-223.

33. Eisenhower, 369-370.

34. Ibid., 369.

35. Frances L. Mitchell, Georgia Land and People (Spartanburg, SC: The Reprint Company, 1974), 233-234.

36. Walter G. Cooper, The Story of Georgia (New York: The American Historical Society, Inc., 1938), 387.

37. Johannsen, 87, 205-206.
 

De Voto, Bernard.  The Year of Decision, 1846.  Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1943.

Del Castillo, Richard G. The Treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo: A Legacy of Conflict.  Norman, OK.  University of Oklahoma Press, 1990.

Sandweiss, Martha A., Stewart Rick, Huseman, Ben W. Eyewitness to War.- Prints and Daguerreotypes of the Mexican War, 1846-1848.  Fort Worth, Tex: Amon Carter Museum; Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989.

Schroeder, John H. Mr. Polk's War.- American Opposition and Dissent, 1846-1848.  Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973.